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COMMENT
CONFLICT OF LAWS: THE RECENT HISTORY OF
MONTANA'S RULES FOR CONTRACTS
Robert C. Lukes"
The world is composed of territorial states having sepa-
rate and differing systems of law. Events and transac-
tions occur, and issues arise, that may have a significant
relationship to more than one state, making necessary a
special body of rules and methods for their ordering and
resolution.'
Courts often confront facts that require them to consider the
application of another jurisdiction's laws. For example, if a tort
occurred or a contract were entered into in state A, but the ac-
tion is brought in state B, the court of state B may find that the
proper law to apply is that of state A.
When the facts presented to a court may invoke the laws of
more than one jurisdiction, the court must determine which
substantive law will control the case. However, if the laws of the
different jurisdictions are equivalent, there is no conflict and the
issue is moot.' Although jurisdictional issues are a subset of the
conflict of laws subject, the determination regarding the substan-
tive law that a court should apply in a case is a different ques-
tion. Jurisdictional questions involve whether a court can exer-
cise power over a party or subject. On the other hand, substan-
tive conflict of law questions pertain only to the law that a court
will apply to the case and arise after it has established jurisdic-
* In Memory of Robert J. Lukes, M.D. (1922-1994).
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971).
2. See, e.g., Gitano Group, Inc. v. Kemper Group, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 271, 275
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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tion.3
A court determines the applicable substantive law by utiliz-
ing "conflict of laws" or "choice of law" rules. Although this re-
sults in a substantive determination, the process is procedural in
character. Traditionally, this determination is made without
regard to the actual substance of the laws which are in conflict.
A court applies the rules to the facts and reaches a conclusion.
The court's choice of the applicable law is crucial to the outcome
of many cases because it determines which jurisdiction's sub-
stantive law will be applied.
Conflict of laws often arise in contractual disputes. When
parties enter into a contract in one state, and then disputes
involving that contract arise in another, the laws of the two
states may conflict. When these conflicts arise, courts apply a
variety of rules, nearly all of which are judge-made common law
rules.4 The conflict of law rules, like many other procedural
rules of court, have evolved throughout the history of American
jurisprudence.
In Montana, the conflict of law cases concerning contracts
took a new direction beginning in 1979. The Montana Supreme
Court's decisions since that time are inconsistent and have creat-
ed confusion regarding the rules for conflict of laws. This Com-
ment will examine these decisions and discuss the inconsisten-
cies in the law to help clarify the current status of Montana's
conflict of law rules for contracts.
In part one, this Comment reviews the history of the more
significant conflict of laws theories. Part two turns the discussion
to a Field Code statute which has gained recent prominence in
Montana's conflict of laws analysis.5 Part three focuses on three
Montana conflict of law cases which rely on the Field Code stat-
ute. Part four compares these Montana decisions with cases from
other Field Code jurisdictions. In part five, the most recent Mon-
tana Supreme Court conflict of laws case, Casarotto v.
Lombardi,6 is juxtaposed with the court's prior decisions. In
conclusion, this Comment presents several alternatives to the
currently applied rules which should help improve Montana's
conflict of law rules for contracts.
3. For a brief discussion which clarifies this basic distinction, see ROBERT A.
LEFLAR, THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4 (1959).
4. Robert A. Leflar, The Nature of Conflicts Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1080,
1080 (1981).
5. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-102 (1993).
6. 268 Mont. 369, 886 P.2d 931 (1994).
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the 1800s, Joseph Story propounded the first predomi-
nant conflict of laws theory in American jurisprudence.7 Based
on comity, his theory encouraged the recognition of a foreign
jurisdiction's laws in the general interest of justice and sought to
ensure that the presiding forum's laws would be applied recipro-
cally by other jurisdictions.8 Story's theory remained prominent
throughout the states during the later half of the 1800s and had
considerable influence in Europe as well.?
In the early part of this century, scholars extensively criti-
cized Story's approach to the conflict of laws. Joseph Beale's
vested rights theory thereafter gained prominence.' ° In 1934,
Beale was the reporter for the original Restatement of the Con-
flict of Laws [hereinafter First Restatement], which substantially
incorporated his views." The First Restatement dictates that
the law of the place where the contract was made controls the
validity and interpretation of the contract, whereas the law of
the place of performance controls issues concerning perfor-
mance.' Beale 'essentially took the older rule of lex loci con-
tractus, or the law of the place where the contract was entered,
and expanded it to distinguish issues of validity and perfor-
mance.
The First Restatement became the most influential theory
adopted by courts during the first half of this century,'3 despite
widespread criticism by academics.' 4 Although a small number
of jurisdictions continue to apply the rules of the First Restate-
ment, courts and scholars generally recognize it as too rigid and
mechanical, often leading to unjust results." Commentators
7. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN
AND DOMESTIC (1865).
8. Id. § 38, at 34.
9. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.4, at 12-13 (1982).
10. See Scoles & Hay, supra note 9, at 13; see also JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREA-
TISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935).
11. Scoles & Hay, supra note 9, at 13-15.
12. John G. Hanlin, The Choice of Law in the Interpretation of Insurance and
Reinsurance Contracts, 2 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 15 (1991); see also RE-
STATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 311-76 (1934). Historically, the prominence
of this rule in American jurisprudence may be traced back to Scudder v. Union Nat'l
Bank, 91 U.S. 406 (1875).
13. Scoles & Hay, supra note 9, at 15.
14. See generally ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 1, at 1-2 (3d
ed. 1977).
15. See generally James A. McLaughlin, Conflict of Laws: The Choice of Law
Lex Loci Doctrine, the Beguiling Appeal of a Dead Tradition, Part One, 93 W. VA. L.
1995] 555
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have characterized Montana as one of the states that still clings
to the even older rule of lex loci contractus.6 Yet, the Montana
Supreme Court has denied this characterization. 7
General criticisms of the First Restatement and several
influential New York cases 8 led to a second Restatement on the
Conflict of Laws [hereinafter Restatement Second] in 1971. The
Restatement Second abandoned Beale's doctrine of vested rights
and adopted the "most significant relationship" test for the con-
flict of laws. Section 188 of the Restatement Second lists a num-
ber of factors that a court should weigh in contract situations to
determine which jurisdiction's law will apply. 9 This balancing
test from section 188 intends that the law of the jurisdiction
with the most substantial connections to the contract shall con-
trol the case.
The modern conflict of laws debate has generated several
other doctrines in addition to the one enunciated in the Restate-
ment Second, some of which have been adopted by other jurisdic-
tions.20 The amount of scholarship in this area is remarkable,2"
REV. 957 (1991) (claiming that even the certainty strived for in these older rules was
unachieved in implementation).
16. See Hanlin, supra note 12, at n.11; see also Gregory E. Smith, Choice of
Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1172, 1093-94 (1987) (providing an
analysis of conflict of law rules for all United States jurisdictions and classifying
Montana under "First Restatement Rules").
17. Kemp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 183 Mont. 526, 531, 601 P.2d 20, 23 (1979) (de-
claring that the Field Code statute relied upon by the court states the rule of lex
loci solutionis, or "the law of the place of performance").
18. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); Auten v. Auten, 124
N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954).
19. The factors are:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties. These contacts are to be evaluated according to
their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) (1971).
20. For a discussion of these theories and a survey of jurisdictions adopting
them, see Smith, supra note 16. Smith claims that the modern era of conflicts law
began around 1963 and since that time courts have wrestled with these doctrines,
often reaching markedly inconsistent results. Id. at 1041.
21. See, e.g., Paul E. McGreal, Conflict of Laws, 47 SMU L. REV. 865 (1994);
Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government
Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 975 (1994); Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisi-
ana Conflicts Law: Two "Surprises", 54 LA. L. REv. 497 (1994); Stewart E. Sterk,
The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1994);
Thomas H. Day, Solution for Conflict of Laws Governing Fraudulent Transfers: Apply
the Law that was Enacted to Benefit the Creditors, 48 BUS. LAW. 889 (1993); Kirt
4
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with the complexity and confusion engendered by this subject ap-
parent from the different types of rules that courts use. The
foregoing discussion provides a limited synopsis of the history of
the conflict of laws and places Montana's current rules in a larg-
er context.
II. MONTANA'S FIELD CODE STATUTE
In 1865, David Dudley Field submitted an enormous body of
codified laws-the Field Code-to the New York legislature.22
The Field Code was part of the movement to reform the system
of laws in the United States during the 1800s and was intended
as a comprehensive body of law that would entirely supplant the
common law.2" Although Field's home state of New York never
adopted the substantive portions of the Code,' five western
states adopted it in the late 1800s, including Montana.25 These
states abandoned the general purpose behind Field's creation
however, and adopted the Code in addition to the existing com-
mon law.
The Montana statute on conflict of laws, adopted verbatim
from the Field Code, is found at section 28-3-102 of the Montana
O'Neill, Contractual Choice of Law: The Case for a New Determination of Full Faith
and Credit Limitations, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1019 (1993); Dennis J. Tuchler, A Short
Summary of American Conflicts Law: Choice of Law, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 391
(1993); Russel J. Weintraub, An Approach to Choice of Law that Focuses on Conse-
quences, 56 ALB. L. REV. 701 (1993); Brian N. Eisen, Cross Training: Sports Litiga-
tion and the Conflict of Laws, 3 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 41 (1993); James A.
McLaughlin, Conflict of Laws: The New Approach to Choice of Law: Justice in Search
of Certainty, Part Two, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 73 (1991); Ethan Glaubiger, Using Princi-
ples of Conflict of Laws to Chart the Murky Waters of Contractual Indemnity:
Angelina Casualty Co. v. Exxon Corp., USA, 15 TUL. MAR. L. J. 411 (1991); Richard
J. Bauerfeld, Effectiveness of Choice-of-law Clauses in Contract Conflicts of Law: Par-
ty Autonomy or Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1659 (1982).
22. Roscoe Pound, David Dudley Field: An Appraisal, in FIELD CENTENARY
ESSAYS 3, 9 (Allison Reppy ed., 1949).
23. THE CIViL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 6 (Proposed Draft 1865).
Field's declared purpose was not to create new laws for the state, but simply to codi-
fy the then existing common law of his time. Rodolfo Batiza, Sources of the Field
Civil Code: The Civil Law Influences on a Common Law Code, 60 TuL. L. REV. 799,
801 (1986).
24. Pound, supra note 22, at 10. New York adopted a Code of Civil Procedure
between 1876 and 1880 which was largely based on Field's work, but the remainder
of his work was never adopted by the state which had originally commissioned the
work. Id. .at 9-10.
25. Joseph M. Cormack, Conflict of Laws in Regard to Contracts in Field Code
States Other than California, 12 S. CAL. L. REv. 362, 363 (1939). For a history of
Montana's adoption of the Field Codes and their impact, see Andrew P. Morriss, This
State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws: Lessons From One Hundred Years of Codifica-
tion, 56 MONT. L. REv. 359 (1995).
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Code [hereinafter the Field Code statute]. This statutory rule for
the conflict of laws remains unchanged since its enactment in
1895 and reads:
WHAT LAW AND USAGE TO GOVERN INTERPRETATION. A contract
is to be interpreted according to the law and usage of the
place where it is to be performed or, if it does not indicate a
place of performance, according to the law and usage of the
place where it is made.26
The Field Code statute is a rule of interpretation for contracts.
Although historically commentators distinguished between the
interpretation of a contract and its construction, it is now gener-
ally accepted that the interpretation includes both the construc-
tion and the legal effect of the contract's words.27 Problematic to
the application of the Field Code statute is the court's ability to
distinguish an issue involving the interpretation of a contract
from one involving a contract's validity. The Field Code statute
technically applies only in cases where the issue concerns inter-
pretation.
The Restatement of Contracts states: "Interpretations of
words and of other manifestations of intention forming an agree-
ment, or having reference to the formation of an agreement, is
the ascertainment of the meaning to be given to such words and
manifestations."28 Unfortunately, the interpretation of a con-
tract is often inexorably tied to its validity, and many of these
distinctions ultimately appear to be a matter of legal seman-
tics.29 As the Field Code statute is founded upon distinguishing
26. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-102 (1993).
27. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, The Law of Contracts, §§ 3-9 (3d
ed. 1987). Although the distinction between interpretation and construction is still
advocated by some commentators, even they recognize that (1) in many cases it is
impossible to draw a line between the interpretation and construction; and (2) courts
have generally ignored the distinction. See, e.g., Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpreta-
tion and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 837 (1964). Professor
Patterson has defined the interpretation of a contract as "the process of endeavoring
to ascertain the meaning or meanings of symbolic expressions used by the parties."
Id. at 833. On the other hand, Patterson claims construction "is a process by which
legal consequences are made to follow from the terms of the contract and its more or
less immediate context." Id. at 835. This lack of clarity concerning the definition of
interpretation creates significant problems for applying Field Code statute. For the
purpose of this Comment on Montana conflict of laws, and in line with the modern
view, the word "interpretation" is taken to include construction. See also E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.1 (1982).
28. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 226 (1932). See also, Calamari & Perillo,
supra note 27, §§ 3-9.
29. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 27, §§ 3-9. "It is even difficult to tell
558 [Vol. 56
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issues of interpretation, its application becomes uncertain and
enigmatic.
In juxtaposition to the interpretation of a contract stands its
validity. If a contract fails basic questions of validity, issues of
interpretation are rendered moot. As the Field Code statute
governs only issues of interpretation, it does not apply as a con-
flict of laws rule when the issue concerns the validity of the
agreement.
However, when issues of interpretation arise, the Field Code
statute is a strict rule based on performance. In these cases, the
court should determine whether it can ascertain a place of per-
formance from the contract, and if so, the court should apply the
law from that place of performance. During the past fifteen years
the Montana Supreme Court has used the Field Code statute as
a platform to invoke a general rule distinguishing between issues
of validity of a contract and issues of interpretation.0 Beginning
in 1979 31-with one major exception-the court has relied upon
the Field Code statute to determine its conflict of law rules for
contracts.32
III. THE MONTANA CASES
In older cases involving the conflict of laws, the Montana
Supreme Court largely avoided the subject for nearly half a cen-
tury and never recognized the import of the Field Code statute in
this arena.' Although travel and commerce during the early
part of this century were more limited and the potential for in-
terstate conflict thereby reduced, the early cases on point avoid-
ed any discussion of potential conflicts.' In 1931, the Montana
Supreme Court first discussed the conflict of laws: the court
employed the rule of lex loci contractus without any reference to
whether the Restatement definition of interpretation refers to interpretation or con-
struction or both." Id.
30. See infra part III.
31. Kemp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 183 Mont. 526, 601 P.2d 20 (1979).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 42-79. But cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Estate of Braun, 243 Mont. 125, 793 P.2d 253 (1990). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 81-85.
33. See Shelton R. Williams, Conflict of Laws: Does R.C.M. 1935, Section 7537
Require the Conclusion that the "Place of Performance" Governs the Essential Validity
of a Contract?, 2 MONT. L. REV. 74 (1941) (claiming that as of publication, the Mon-
tana courts had yet to discuss the Field Code statute).
34. E.g., Capital Fin. Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 75 Mont. 460, 243 P.
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the Field Code statute.35 Yet, in a later case decided during the
1950s, the Montana Supreme Court put insurance companies on
notice that they will be subject to the rule of lex fori, or the law
of the forum.3" This meant that the court would always apply
Montana law, regardless of other factual considerations."
Prior to the Montana Supreme Court's most recent decision
in Casarotto, the seminal case in Montana for conflicts law was
Kemp v. Allstate Insurance Co. from 1979.8 The only notable
conflict of laws case before Kemp is In re Estate of
Dauenhauer,39 in which the court determined a child's legitima-
cy for purposes of inheritance. Confronted with a conflict of laws
issue, the court in Dauenhauer did not rely upon Montana case
law or statutory law, but relied instead upon the First Restate-
ment and the Restatement Second. 0 Because Dauenhauer did
not involve a contract situation, the Field Code statute did not
apply. However, the case is important in this context for the
Montana Supreme Court's recognition of the general applicability
of the Restatements when conflict of law questions arise. More-
over, in 1980 the Ninth Circuit looked to Dauenhauer, not to
Kemp, for guidance to determine Montana's conflict of law rules
in a contractual situation and applied "the most significant rela-
tionship" test from the Restatement Second."1 Thus, both the
Montana Supreme Court and the federal court applying Montana
law employed the Restatement in a narrow area of the conflict of
laws in the past.
In 1979, the Montana Supreme Court for the first time rec-
ognized the import of the Field Code statute in Kemp v. Allstate
Insurance Co.'2 Kemp is important for several reasons. First, it
35. Styles v. Byrne, 89 Mont. 243, 296 P. 577 (1931). The doctrine of lex loci
contractus demands the law of the place where the contract was entered into shall
control the case.
36. Trammel v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 126 Mont.
400, 409, 253 P.2d 329, 334 (1953) (applying Montana law and public policy to in-
clude a divorced wife within the insurance contract's meaning of "dependent").
37. Note that regardless of the conflict of laws rule that Montana applies, this
is very often the result. See infra note 72.
38. 183 Mont. 526, 601 P.2d 20 (1979).
39. 167 Mont. 83, 535 P.2d 1005 (1975).
40. Dauenhauer, 167 Mont. at 86, 535 P.2d at 1006.
41. Energy Oils, Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 626 F.2d 731, 734 n.6 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that Montana law applied to the construction of assignments of oil
and gas leases). The federal court appears to assume that Montana's recognition of
the Restatement Second as valid authority in Dauenhauer made it a legitimate
source for any conflict of laws issue. The Field Code statute is not discussed in the
federal court's opinion. Id.
42. 183 Mont. 526, 531, 601 P.2d 20, 23 (1979).
560 [Vol. 56
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signals a departure from the prior cases in its recognition of the
Field Code statute as determinative in conflict of laws for con-
tracts. Second, in recognizing the efficacy of the Field Code stat-
ute in Kemp, the Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that
statutory law will control court rules which in other jurisdictions
are generally judge made. Finally, the court in Kemp attempted
to augment the statutory rule to cover situations beyond the
interpretation of contracts, thus providing a more complete con-
flict of laws rule for Montana.
In Kemp, the plaintiffs car accident in Montana was covered
under two insurance policies: one entered into in New York and
one in Vermont.4' The court recognized a conflict between the
laws of these states and Montana concerning the possibility of
"stacking" the uninsured motorist coverage. 44
Allstate argued that Montana followed lex loci contractus
and therefore, the law of Vermont should apply to the policy
entered into in Vermont, while New York law should apply to
the New York policy.'8 If the court in Kemp applied the laws of
these other jurisdictions, it would have precluded the "stacking"
of the plaintiffs policies and denied an increased recovery. Un-
like New York and Vermont, Montana permits the insured to
stack uninsured motorist polices." Therefore, under Montana
law a dramatically different recovery would result.
In contrast, the plaintiff urged the court to renounce lex loci
contractus as "archaic," and to apply the most significant rela-
tionship test from the Restatement Second. 47 The court did not
follow either argument, declaring that "[n]either party has cor-
rectly interpreted the affect in this case" of the Field Code stat-
ute.48 The court interpreted the statute to prescribe the rule of
lex loci solutionis, or the law of the place of performance.49 The
court stated:
43. Id at 528, 601 P.2d at 21.
44. Id. at 528-35, 601 P.2d at 21-24. "Stacking" laws concern the ability of the
insured to add separate uninsured motorist policies together for greater coverage.
Because of the contradictory positions of many jurisdictions, the issue of stacking is
notably present in many recent conflict of law cases. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302 (1981); California Casualty Indem. Exch. v. Pettis, 239 Cal. Rptr. 205
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
45. Kemp, 183 Mont. at 530-31, 601 P.2d at 22-23.
46. See Bennett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 261 Mont. 386, 862 P.2d
1146 (1993).
47. Kemp, 183 Mont. at 531, 601 P.2d at 23.
48. Id.
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Under the statute, it is only when the contract does not indi-
cate a place of performance that the interpretation would fall
under the rule of lex loci contractus. In this situation, we look
to the contract to determine if there is a place of performance
indicated; if there is, the law of the place of performance con-
trols under our statute, and there is no need to determine the
law of the place where the contract was made. ... '
The Kemp court then examined the insurance policies for indica-
tions of place of performance, noting that the policies were both
valid in the United States and Canada. The court concluded that
Montana, as part of the United States, was a contemplated place
of performance.51 Once this determination was made, the court
applied the Field Code statute and held that Montana law ap-
plied.52 Thus, the stacking of the policies was permitted which
increased the plaintiffs recovery.
The Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of place of
performance under the Field Code statute in Kemp was enor-
mously broad. 53 Because the contract was valid anywhere in the
United States or Canada, the court held that the parties had
therefore designated Montana as the place of performance. This
is quite a stretch. If this broad standard was consistently ap-
plied, one is hard pressed to create a realistic hypothetical where
Montana law would not control a contractual dispute.
Not only did the court in Kemp provide the broadest possible
interpretation in its determination of the place of performance,
but in its reliance upon the Field Code statute, it neglected to
mention that the statute would only apply in questions regarding
interpretation. As the previous quote from Kemp indicates, the
court implied that if any place of performance is decipherable
from the contract, the law of that place must be applied. The
court's language in Kemp is markedly forceful, mandating con-
siderations that make the place of performance primary. A read-
er relying upon Kemp could easily conclude that so long as a
contract was valid and performable in Montana, the court would
50. Id.
51. Kemp, at 531-32, 601 P.2d at 23. But see Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 771 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1985). Under facts similar to Kemp, the federal court
in Rhody sharply criticizes the Montana Supreme Court for determining that the
policy language intended Montana as a place of performance. The court in Rhody
held that no place of performance was indicated by such contractual language and
looked instead to where the contact was formed. Id. at 1419-20 & n.3.
52. Kemp, 183 Mont. at 533-34, 601 P.2d at 24-25.
53. See supra note 51 and comments concerning Rhody.
562 [Vol. 56
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apply Montana law to the case.
Later in its opinion, the Kemp court turned to alternative
sources to justify its resurrection of the heretofore idle Field
Code statute. The court cited an older California case for "the
longstanding rule [the Blair rule] that the law of place of perfor-
mance of an insurance contract controls as to its legal construc-
tion and effect, but the law of the place where the contract was
made governs on questions of execution and validity."' When
the court relied upon the Blair rule, it expanded the scope of its
conflict of law rules beyond that of the Field Code statute. In ad-
dition to conflict rules for the interpretation of contracts, the
Blair rule encompasses considerations of what law should apply
concerning issues of validity and execution. Thus, the breadth of
the Field Code statute grew to potentially become a complete
conflict of laws rule for contracts.
Indeed, in later cases in Montana, the Blair rule superseded
the implementation of Field Code statute.55 The Montana Su-
preme Court would cite to the Field Code statute, but then quote
or follow the Blair rule's interpretation of the statute. Although
the Blair rule's first appearance in Kemp is dicta, later cases
relied heavily upon it as the final word on Montana's conflict of
law rules for Montana.
The court's expansion of the Field Code statute with the
Blair rule essentially augmented the rule of performance with
the doctrine of lex loci contractus to cover issues of execution and
validity. The main distinction in the Blair rule between execu-
tion and validity versus interpretation are similar to the First
Restatement, yet the application of this distinction achieves a
diametrically opposed result. The First Restatement assigns
questions of interpretation to the law of the place where the con-
tract was formed; whereas the Blair rule, as it includes the man-
date of the Field Code statute, applies the law of the place of
54. Kemp, 183 Mont. at 533, 601 P.2d at 24 (citing Blair v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 104 P.2d 1075 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940)). The court also claimed that the ruling is in
accord with section 206 of the Restatement Second concerning "issues relating to
details of performance of a contract." Yet, section 206 clearly refers to minor "details"
of a contract, such as "manner, method and time" of performance. Comment b to this
section explicitly contains a caveat stating that "this Section is applicable only to de-
tails of performance and not to those matters which substantially affect the nature
and extent of the obligations imposed by the contract." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 206, cmt. b (1971).
55. See Omaha Property and Casualty Co. v. Crosby, 756 F. Supp. 1380 (D.
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performance to questions of interpretation.
Because the Blair rule is based on distinctions similar to the
those relied upon by the First Restatement, it consequently suf-
fers from many of the same deficiencies. First, it is a rigid rule,
providing little flexibility for a court to weigh the specific factors
of a case. Second, as noted previously, many factual situations
defy any clear distinction between interpretation and validity:
often both elements are at issue.5" Furthermore, Kemp's intro-
duction of the Blair rule without any discussion as to how it
differed from or expanded the scope of the Field Code statute
generated additional confusion. The rule that emerges from
Kemp is not only antiquated and rigid but suffers from a serious
lack of clarity.
The next case concerning the conflict of laws in Montana
arose in the federal district court. In Omaha Property and Casu-
alty Company v. Crosby,57 the issue presented was whether a
parent had an insurable interest in an automobile insurance
contract. In Crosby, a parent purchased an automobile insurance
policy in Montana and the son was later in an accident in Alas-
ka.' Initially, the court addressed whether the law of Alaska or
Montana would control the validity of the insurable interest.5 9
The court treated the conflict of law issue in summary fashion,
relying entirely upon the direction provided by the Montana
Supreme Court in Kemp.
In its reliance on Kemp, the federal court cited the Field
Code statute, then noted the Kemp interpretation of the statute
which pronounced the Blair rule. ° The Crosby court distin-
guished between the "legal construction and effect" and the "exe-
cution and validity" of the contract; it then concluded that since
the validity of the agreement was at issue, the law of the place
where the contract was formed would control.61 The court cor-
rectly recognized that under the Blair rule the insurable interest
involved a question of validity of the contract and therefore, the
location specified for performance in the contract was immateri-
al. 2 Because no interpretation of the contract was necessary,
56. Patterson, supra note 27.
57. 756 F. Supp. 1380 (D. Mont. 1990) (opinion by United States Circuit Judge
Pregerson of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation as a United States District
Court Judge for the District of Montana).
58. Id. at 1381.
59. Id. at 1381-82.
60. Id. at 1382-83.
61. Id. at 1383.
62. Crosby, 756 F. Supp. at 1383. Some commentators claim that the distinction
[Vol. 56564
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the Field Code statute did not apply and only the broader Blair
rule from Kemp was relevant. The federal court accordingly ap-
plied Montana law and determined that the insurable interest
was valid.63
Following Crosby, the conflict of laws issue was again pre-
sented to the Montana Supreme Court in Youngblood v. Ameri-
can States Insurance Co." Youngblood involved an insurance
policy issued in Oregon and a subsequent accident that occurred
in Montana.' The main issue in the case was whether the sub-
rogation clause in the policy would enable the insurance compa-
ny to recoup from the plaintiff medical payments made on her
behalf after she settled with the tortfeasor." The court quoted
the Blair rule from Kemp, but did not actually state whether the
issue of the case revolved around the interpretation or the valid-
ity of the contract.6" The court applied the rule without making
this prerequisite distinction.
In Youngblood, the court identified language in the policy
that "requires American States to pay whatever damages are
required in Montana; that is, the contract is to be performed in
Montana."' Although unclear, it appears that the court must
have concluded that the issue concerned the interpretation of the
contract and applied the performance aspect of the Blair rule. If
the subrogation clause's applicability involved the validity of the
contract, the court should have applied the law where the con-
tract was entered into, i.e. Oregon. Under Oregon law, subroga-
tion clauses are valid.69
The Youngblood decision extended further the conflict of law
rules in Montana. The court supplemented its analysis, as based
on the rules from Kemp, with additional considerations primary
between validity and interpretation is simply an escape method for the courts to
apply the law achieving their desired result. See Smith, supra note 16, at 1043 n.12;
see also Joseph M. Cormack, California Conflict of Laws in Regard to Contracts, 12
S. CAL. L. REV. 335, 337 (1939) ("The validity of a contract in its every aspect de-
termines every detail of performance . . . whether and how a contract is to be per-
formed will completely determine the nature of its validity. Thus from a legal
standpoint the execution and performance aspects of a contract cannot be separat-
ed.").
63. Crosby, 756 F. Supp. at 1383-84.
64. 262 Mont. 391, 866 P.2d 203 (1993).
65. Youngblood, 262 Mont. at 393-94, 866 P.2d at 204.
66. Id.
67. Id at 394, 866 P.2d at 205.
68. Id One can only infer that again, as in Kemp, the court has taken general
policy language describing geographic limits on the validity of the policy and em-
ployed these to determine Montana as the place of performance.
69. Id. at 395, 866 P.2d at 205.
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to conflict of law rules in contracts."0 First, the opinion noted
that Montana recognizes choice-of-law provisions within con-
tracts as a valid expression of the parties intention to select the
law that will govern all questions concerning a contract.71 Sec-
ond, Youngblood concluded that Montana is not bound to uphold
a clause within a contract, even if bargained for, if it is repug-
nant to the public policy of the state.7 2
These additional rules account for the somewhat confusing
analysis in the Youngblood opinion. After recognizing that the
insurance policy indicated Montana as the place of performance,
thereby determining Montana as the applicable law, the court
recognized that the contract included a choice-of-law provision.73
This provision indicated that Oregon law controlled the applica-
tion of the subrogation clause.74 After noting that such clauses
are enforceable and valid under Oregon law, the court applied
70. Youngblood, 262 Mont. at 395, 866 P.2d at 205. The majority of conflict of
law rules require a court to consider the facts to procedurally determine which
jurisdiction's law should be applied. However, one should note that some of these
conflict rules do concern choices-of "internal law," where the court goes beyond the
mere facts of the case to compare the possible substantive laws and determine the
result of their application in the case. As we shall see, this is the type of factor that
the Montana court includes with its considerations of public policy in Youngblood.
71. See also Steinke v. Boeing Co., 525 F.Supp. 234 (D. Mont. 1981). The gen-
eral rule in American jurisprudence recognizes the freedom of the parties to contract
to choice of law. Hanlin, supra note 12, at 16. Cf Casarotto v. Lombardi, 268 Mont.
369, 886 P.2d 931 (1994).
72. Youngblood, 262 Mont. at 395, 866 P.2d at 205. See also Steinke v. Boeing
Co., 525 F. Supp. 234, 236 (D. Mont. 1981); Hein v. Fox, 126 Mont. 514, 254 P.2d
1076 (1953).
Although Youngblood has characterized the imposition of public policy as part
of contract law (which it undoubtedly is), in this context it is more often recognized
as the final stage in the conflict of laws determination. That is, once the determina-
tion of a foreign jurisdiction's law is reached, this law can be compared to the public
policies of the forum state to ensure that no injustice is permitted through the hands
of the presiding court. For further discussion, see generally, Michael G. Guajardo,
Note, Texas' Adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws: Public Policy
is the Trump Card, But When Can it be Played?, 22 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 837 (1991).
The reader should note the Montana Supreme Court's tendency to apply Mon-
tana law. This is not atypical of other jurisdictions. The flexibility provided by the
current confusion in conflict of law rules has created a situation where the court
would be free to choose a rule which achieved a particular outcome, if it so desired.
Additionally, the application of Montana public policy by the court can easily be seen
as the final trump, which can be exercised by the court on any given occasion to
select Montana law.
73. Youngblood, 262 Mont. at 394-95, 866 P.2d at 205.
74. Id. at 395, 866 P.2d at 205. The agreement states that "the Company shall
be entitled to reimbursement or subrogation in accordance with the provisions of
[Oregon Revised Statutes] 743.825." Id.
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Montana public policy to invalidate the clause. 5 To reiterate:
the court first recognized the applicability of Montana law be-
cause of the Blair rule, but retracted it because of the choice-of-
law provision in favor of Oregon law, then finally reinstated
Montana law because of public policy considerations.76 Thus in
Youngblood, public policy considerations trumped all other con-
flict of law factors.
The conflict of law rules from Kemp through Youngblood are
very unclear. Kemp recognized the authority of the Field Code
statute as a rule of performance for conflict of laws in contractu-
al situations.7" The Kemp court, in dicta, then augmented the
statute with the Blair rule. The federal court in Crosby utilized
the Blair rule, correctly distinguishing between issues of validity
and those of interpretation. 8 The Montana Supreme Court in
Youngblood next cited the Blair rule from Kemp, operated de
facto under a determination of place of performance, but neglect-
ed to address whether the issue concerned one of validity or
interpretation. Despite Youngblood's affirmation of Montana's
recognition of choice-of-law provisions in contracts, the court
used Montana public policy as a final trump in the conflict of
laws analysis to eviscerate the choice-of-law provision.9
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE KEMP ERA
The conflict of law rules, as stated and followed by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court during the Kemp era, are problematic for
four reasons. First, as noted above, the court's strong language
in Kemp concerning the Field Code statute leads the practitioner
to believe that courts should follow indications of the place of
performance in all circumstances. Second, the court expands the
Field Code statute in dictum without adequately discussing the
concepts of validity or interpretation of a contract. The court in
Kemp should have alerted the practitioner that this initial dis-
tinction is necessary and prescribed some guidelines for this
task.
The third reason that the conflict of law rules during the
Kemp era are problematic is that, even with a complete under-
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Kemp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 183 Mont. 526, 531, 601 P.2d 20, 23 (1979).
78. Omaha Property & Casualty Co. v. Crosby, 756 F. Supp. 1380, 1382-83 (D.
Mont. 1990).
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standing of the distinction between validity and interpretation, it
is nearly impossible to distinguish between these two issues in
many cases. As noted, many times both elements are at issue.
8
0
The result is a rule that is based upon an unclear distinction
which creates an arbitrary conclusion.
Fourth, even when clearly defined and implemented, the
Blair rule, like many of the older conflict of law rules, is anti-
quated and poorly suited for a modern court. The world has
changed since the nineteenth century. Commerce and travel are
now international. Litigation is no longer centered around tech-
nical rules of pleading. The modern conflict of law rules have
likewise evolved markedly since the creation of the Field Code
statute and the Blair rule, generally reflecting the other changes
in law and society since that time. Most courts have adopted
modern rules to provide greater flexibility in weighing the di-
verse interests and contractual situations which are brought
before them. Courts found the older conflict of law rules, such as
the Blair rule, to be too rigid in their application, resulting in
unjust verdicts for the litigants.
Beyond these enumerated problems, Montana's conflict of
law rules from the Kemp era suffer from other more general
inadequacies. For example, one primary rule of contracts that all
courts attempt to follow is to fulfill the intentions of the parties.
To discern these intentions, courts will often carefully scrutinize
a contract or admit extrinsic evidence. In cases involving the
conflict of laws in contracts, courts generally have this same
purpose. With the modern complexity of contracts, commerce and
laws, it is difficult to imagine that a court can ascertain the
intentions of the parties simply by determining a place of perfor-
mance or through often arbitrary discernment of validity and
interpretation.
A good example of the potential inflexibility and harshness
of the older rules is evident from the facts in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Estate of Braun,s" a recent Mon-
tana case. In Braun, a Montana resident was in a fatal car acci-
dent in Canada, and Canadian law drastically restricted the
recovery available under his insurance policy.82 The main issue
80. This is demonstrated by Youngblood. Does the issue in Youngblood relate to
whether the subrogation clause is valid, or does the issue involve the clause's inter-
pretation, its legal effect requiring repayment?
81. 243 Mont. 125, 793 P.2d 253 (1990).
82. Braun, 243 Mont. at 126, 793 P.2d at 253-54. Imposition of Canadian law
would have limited the damages to funeral expenses only. Id. at 132, 793 P.2d at
568 [Vol. 56
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in Braun was whether Canadian law would operate to limit the
damages available under the insurance contract. As an issue of
interpretation, under the Field Code statute and the court's
broad conception of "place of performance" from Kemp, a court
applying the statute should have concluded that Canada was a
place of performance as indicated in the policy and applied Cana-
dian law. This interpretation would have reduced the available
recovery under the policy from $200,000 as permitted by Mon-
tana law, to simply the costs of funeral expenses, as provided for
by Canadian law.'
Nevertheless, the court in Braun claimed that "[t]he ques-
tion of whether Montana law or Canadian law should govern the
measure of damages available to Appellants is a conflict of laws
question regarding tort law."" It is unclear from the opinion
why the court distinguished these facts from Kemp or Crosby,
which applied contractual rules for conflict of laws. The Montana
Supreme Court does not mention the Field Code statute or the
Blair rule from Kemp. Perhaps the strangest element of the
Braun opinion is the court's declaration that neither party had
argued that Canadian law should apply to the contract,' when
that appeared to be the main issue in the case.
The court in Braun did little to clarify Montana conflict of
law rules and the decision perhaps best serves as an example of
just how confused this area of the law has become in Montana.
Because the dispute in Braun involved how much recovery the
insurance contract permitted, the issue can best be characterized
as one of interpretation. In Montana, the Field code statute ap-
plies to issues of interpretation. Without the availability of the
public policy exception provided for in Youngblood, the court
257 (Weber, J., dissenting). Justice Weber's dissent would have limited Braun's recov-
ery to this amount on basic contract theory. The insurance policy contained a clause
which stated that the policy limited damages to those "legally entitled to collect from
the owner." Id. at 131, 793 P.2d at 257 (Weber, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 131-32, 793 P.2d at 256-57 (Weber, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 127, 793 P.2d at 254 (emphasis added). The court states that "no
question exists that Montana law governs the interpretation of the insurance contract
at issue here." Id. For this reason, and given other inconsistencies in the opinion,
this Comment has treated Braun as an anomaly. Thus, it was not included in the
substantive analysis on Montana's conflict of law rules.
Although conflict of law rules regarding torts are rarely addressed by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court, it appears that even under these rules, the court should have
applied Canadian law in Braun. Prior case law indicates that Montana follows the
rule that "the law of the place of the injury controls." Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
Inc., 162 Mont. 401, 406, 512 P.2d 702, 705 (1973).
85. Braun, 243 Mont. at 127-31, 793 P.2d at 254-56.
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under the Field Code statute would have been forced to apply
Canadian law and essentially remove any insurance recovery af-
ter a wrongful death. Those would have been harsh results in-
deed, and it is no surprise that the court in Braun refused to
permit it.
In Kemp and its progeny, the Montana Supreme Court rec-
ognized the rigidity of the Field Code statute. As previously
noted, the court's recognition of the rigidity and incompleteness
of the Field Code statute accounts for its modification of the
statute in Kemp with the Blair Rule and the imposition public
policy considerations in Youngblood. Yet, these modifications
have only made an old and mediocre law more confusing and
arbitrary. Unlike the federal court in Crosby, both Montana
Supreme Court cases fail to discuss the necessary distinction
between interpretation and validity. Furthermore, the public
policy exception created in Youngblood could be interpreted to
lead to the doctrine of lex fori, or the law of the forum. Many of
the modern conflict of law rules do provide for public policy con-
siderations, but at least they attempt to delineate the scope and
application of public policy.
However, the court has altered Montana's rules for conflict
of laws since Youngblood. In its most recent case, Casarotto v.
Lombardi,86 the Montana Supreme Court has abruptly moved
away from the Kemp rules without resolving any of the prior
confusion or indicating for the future whether the court will
return to Kemp and its progeny. Indeed, time may prove that the
court has discarded the Field Code statute and Kemp. However,
at the present time Casarotto still leaves the door open on this
older line of cases. Yet before turning to Casarotto, it is neces-
sary to first complete the analysis of the Kemp era and the Field
Code statute, for despite Casarotto, there is a strong possibility
that the court may resurrect the Field Code statute at any time.
With this in mind, the following discussion of how the courts of
other Field Code jurisdictions have operated should be instruc-
tive. In the late nineteenth century, California, North Dakota,
South Dakota and Oklahoma also adopted the same Field Code
statute on the conflict of laws as Montana.87 The discussion now
turns to the courts of these other jurisdictions and their conflict
of law rules under the Field Code statute.
86. 268 Mont. 369, 886 P.2d 931 (1994).
87. See Cormack, supra note 25, at 362.
570 [Vol. 56
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V. OTHER FIELD CODE JURISDICTIONS
A. California"8
In California, despite earlier recognition of the efficacy of the
Field Code statute,89 the courts have recently applied the stat-
ute inconsistently, demonstrating a definite tendency for Califor-
nia to depart from the application of the rule based on perfor-
mance.90 One should initially note that California departed from
the strict application of the Field Code statute by augmenting it
with the Blair rule, which the Montana Supreme Court later
followed in Kemp." Although a recent California case indicates
in dicta that the Field Code statute entirely controls the conflict
of laws in California, 92 what this recent case espouses has not
been historically practiced by the court.93
A large exception to the application to the Field Code statute
was created by the California Appellate Court in Henderson v.
Superior Court.9' In Henderson, the court stated that "where
the application of [the Field Code statute] is obscure, California
courts are guided by the factors set out in Restatement, Conflict
of Laws 2d, section 188, in determining what law to apply to the
contract."95 The courts in several cases since Henderson have
employed this exception to use the Restatement Second for the
conflict of law analysis instead of relying upon the Field Code
statute.8 Consequently, Henderson provides an easy escape
from the application of the Field Code statute.
88. The Field Code statute in California is CAL. CV. CODE § 1646 (West 1993).
89. E.g., In re Grace's Estate, 200 P.2d 189, 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (-The law
of the place determines the manner and method as well as the legality of the acts
required for performance.").
90. E.g., California Casualty Indem. Exch. v. Pettis, 239 Cal. Rptr. 205, 208-14
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (ignoring the Field Code statute and applying the Restatement
Second test of most significant relationship).
91. Blair v. New York Life Ins. Co., 104 P.2d 1075, 1078 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940).
92. Gitano Group, Inc. v. Kemper Group, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 271, 275, n.4 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994) (ruling that no true conflict was presented between the laws of the
alternate jurisdictions, so the determination of which law controlled was moot).
93. See Shippers Dev. Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 388,
396 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (finding that the Blair rule should be followed "unless the
terms of the contract provide otherwise or the circumstances indicate a different
intention").
94. 142 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (ruling on a contract similar to a
common law marriage).
95. Henderson, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
96. See, e.g., American Re-Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm. of State of Cal., 527 F.
Supp. 444, 450-51 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Kracht v. Perrin, Gartland & Doyle, 268 Cal.
Rptr. 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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The federal courts have also noted the progression of the
California's conflict of law rules and the general supplementation
of the Field Code statute. Even before Henderson, the Ninth
Circuit noted that "[ulnder the leadership of former Chief Justice
Roger Traynor, the California law moved away from a mechani-
cal choice of law process to employ the 'governmental interest
analysis' approach.9 7 Although California does not rely solely
upon the Field Code statute, its case law on the subject is some-
what unclear. The court has incorporated the conflict of law
rules from the Restatement Second, but has failed as yet to dis-
entangle itself from a confused history of precedent. This is quite
similar to the current situation in Montana. The Field Code
statute still looms in the background of California case law,
permitting continued confusion and threatening to raise its head
without warning again in the future.
B. North Dakota'8
In the early 1970s, the North Dakota Supreme Court heard
a case which questioned the interest charges on a payable note
in a sister state (Montana) as usurious and therefore unenforce-
able. 9 The court recognized that the interest charges were ille-
gal according to the law of North Dakota. However, because of
the constraints of the Field Code statute, the court was com-
pelled to find that the laws of Montana controlled the ques-
tion."° The opinion of Judge Paulson made the court's disdain
for the statutory limitations on its conflict of laws choice clear,
yet the court nevertheless followed the Field Code statute to
determine that Montana law should control. 10 1
In the following year, responding to the court's candid deci-
sion, the North Dakota Legislature repealed its Field Code
statute.10 2 In two cases decided since the statute has been re-
97. Strassberg v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 575 F.2d 1262, 1263-64 (9th
Cir. 1978). The "governmental interest analysis" considers the stake that the con-
cerned states have in the litigation to determine which law should be applied. Al-
though originally designed for application in the tort area of conflict of laws, the
federal court in Strassberg claims that the rule is "applied to contracts cases as well
as the more familiar tort context.' Id. at 1264.
98. The North Dakota Field Code statute was at N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-11
(1993) (repealed).
99. First Nat'l Bank v. Dreher, 202 N.W.2d 670 (N.D. 1972).
100. Dreher, 202 N.W.2d at 671-72.
101. Id. at 672.
102. See Apollo Sprinkler Co., Inc. v. Fire Sprinkler Suppliers & Design, Inc.,
382 N.W.2d 386, 389, n.2 (N.D. 1986).
572 [Vol. 56
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pealed, the parties agreed to employ the "most significant con-
tacts" test as described by Professor Leflar. °3 This test pro-
vides for "choice-influencing considerations" in a process some-
what similar to that adopted by the Restatement Second.'"
The North Dakota Supreme Court has now clearly adopted this
test, and has applied it in several recent cases. ' °"
C. South Dakota"°
Unlike its sister state to the North, South Dakota retains its
Field Code statute on the conflict of laws. The state has recently
undergone a drastic revision of its conflict of law rules in tort,
but a corresponding revision is lacking in contracts. 10 7 Although
in the past, the South Dakota court has ignored the Field Code
statute and applied the general doctrine of lex loci contrac-
tus,'0 5 the statute has regained its full import.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota's correction of a lower
court ruling in Anderson v. Taurus Financial Corporation"°
makes this very clear. In Anderson, the trial court applied the
"most significant contacts" test to determine which law applied
in an action claiming usury interests and deceptive advertis-
ing. ° However, on appeal the Supreme Court of North Dakota
relied entirely upon the Field Code statute, determining that
since the contract provided for payments to be made in Califor-
nia, it was the place of performance of the contract and therefore
the governing law."' The court specifically noted that the lower
court had "erred in using the theory of significant contacts to
103. Vigen Constr. Co. v. Millers Natl Ins. Co., 436 N.W.2d 254 (N.D. 1989);
Apollo, 382 N.W.2d 386 (N.D. 1986).
104. Robert A Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966). The main factors that Professor Leflar focuses on are: 1)
predictability of results; 2) maintenance of interstate and international order; 3) sim-
plification of the judicial task; 4) advancement of the forum's general interests; and
5) application of the better rule of law. Id. at 282.
105. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 504 N.W.2d 307
(N.D. 1993); Plante v. Columbia Paints, 494 N.W.2d 140 (N.D. 1992).
106. South Dakota's Field Code statute is located at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
53-1-4 (1994).
107. See Owen v. Owen, 444 N.W.2d 710 (S.D. 1989); see also, Charles M.
Thatcher, Choice of Law in Multi-State Tort Actions After Owen v. Owen: The Less
Things Change. . . , 35 S.D. L. REv. 372 (1990).
108. E.g., Briggs v. United Serv. Life Ins. Co., 117 N.W.2d 804, 806-07 (S.D.
1962).
109. 268 N.W.2d 486 (S.D. 1978).
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determine what law should apply." " Furthermore, the higher
court applied the Field Code statute as written and refused to
apply public policy considerations to invalidate the allegedly
usurious interest.1
3
Despite the revision regarding tort rules for conflicts previ-
ously noted, South Dakota has not had revisited the conflict of
laws in contracts since the time of Anderson. However, a federal
court sitting in South Dakota applied a provision in the state's
Uniform Commercial Code to determine which law would apply
to the breach of a contract for the sale of sugar beet pulp. " "
Because the Uniform Commercial Code has limited application,
the Field Code statute presumably retains its preeminence under
South Dakota law as declared in Anderson.
In contrast to the application of the Field Code statute in
Montana, South Dakota courts apply the statute in a straightfor-
ward method, without the assistance of the Blair rule, or other
interpretive devices." 5 The location of performance is often de-
termined by the last act or place of payment of a contract."6
Although the Federal Court of Appeals in the Eighth Circuit has
criticized South Dakota's reliance upon this analysis, these rules
nearly always ensure that the place of performance of a contract
is discoverable." 7
Thus, the Field Code statute is alive and well in South Da-
kota. The court in Anderson resolutely applied the rule. The
court created no additional flexibility through public policy con-
siderations. Although South Dakota may be criticized as operat-
ing under an antiquated or unfair conflict of laws rule, its rule is
relatively straightforward and does not suffer from the lack of
clarity that attends Montana case law.
112. Id. at 488.
113. Id. at 488-89.
114. Golden Plains Feedlot, Inc. v. Great W. Sugar Co., 588 F. Supp. 985, 987-
89 (W.D.S.D. 1984). The UCC provision recognizes the parties may agree to apply
any state or nation's law so long as that jurisdiction bears a reasonable relation to
the transaction. Although there was no election by the parties to choose any
jurisdiction's law, the court held that because of the Field Code statute's preference
for place of performance, Nebraska, as the place of delivery, satisfied the "appropri-
ate relation" test. The court applied Nebraska law. Id. at 990-91.
115. See Anderson, 268 N.W.2d at 488.
116. Id.
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D. Oklahoma"'
The Oklahoma legislature adopted the Field Code statute in
1890. Although the Oklahoma court has used the Field Code
statute to aid in determining the content of terms in an ambigu-
ous contract, 9 the statute has more recently been the center of
discussion involving conflict of laws in contracts. In 1990, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Panama Processes v. Cities Service
Co.120 acknowledged that the Field Code statute controls con-
flict of laws for contracts in Oklahoma. 2 ' The court determined
that "the contract was to be performed in major part in Brazil"
and therefore applied Brazilian law.'22 The court clearly was
not comfortable in its reliance upon the Field Code statute and
in support of its conclusion supplemented its analysis by apply-
ing the Restatement Second's test to reach the same result.'
Only a year after Panama Processes, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court was again confronted with a conflict of laws issue and
moved further from its reliance upon the Field Code statute. In
Bohannan v. Allstate Insurance Co.," the court acknowledged
that the reasons previously enunciated for abandoning lex loci
delictus for tort conflicts in favor of the Restatement Second test
were "equally compelling for abandoning and rejecting the lex
loci contractus rule in contract law."2 The court elaborated up-
118. The Oklahoma statute is located at OKLA- STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 162 (West
1993).
119. See Samson Resources Co. v. Quarles Drilling Co., 783 P.2d 974 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1989). In Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-4-106 (1993) for a statute that is
designed to limit the interpretation of the language in the contract to its colloquial
meaning. Although the wording of this statute is somewhat similar to the Field Code
statute, it has never been relied upon by the Montana courts for either any limita-
tion of a word or any issue of interpretation. The use of the term "language" in the
statute indicates that it was not designed as a conflict of laws provision, but as a
rule of contracts in general.
120. 796 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1990).
121. Panama Processes, 796 P.2d at 287. The court correctly noted that the Field
Code statute states the rule of lex loci solutionis and not lex loci contractus. "It is
only when there is no indication in the contract where performance is to occur that
the interpretation would apply the lex loci contractus rule." Id. Although correctly de-
scribing the internal function of the statute, the Oklahoma Supreme Court failed to
emphasize that the statute is applicable only in disputes over interpretation. This is
precisely the same error the Montana Supreme Court has made.
122. Id. at 288.
123. Id. The court notes that it already applies the Restatement Second test
with regards to conflict of laws in torts. Id. at 288, n.50.
124. 820 P.2d 787 (Okla. 1991).
125. Bohannan, 820 P.2d at 795 (relying upon their reasoning in Brickner v.
Gooden, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974)). One should note how frequently the courts have
mischaracterized the Field Code statute as stating the rule of lex loci contractus. 23
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on the inadequacy of the Field Code statute, declaring, "[N]either
the lex loci contractus rule, nor the lex loci solutionis rule allows
full consideration of the statutes and public policies of the sever-
al states in motor vehicle insurance disputes.""26 The court ap-
plied the test of the Restatement Second to determine the appli-
cable law in the case.
127
The Oklahoma Supreme Court is clearly moving away from
the application of the Field Code statute as a conflict of laws
rule. The court in Bohannan has effectively removed the Field
Code statute from application when there is an insurance dis-
pute with competing state statutes and public policies. As noted
above, this is one of the areas in which conflict of laws most
frequently arises. 128 The Oklahoma court has indicated its dis-
satisfaction with the Field Code statute, and in the future it will
probably apply the test of the Restatement Second in all contrac-
tual conflict of law cases.
In contrasting these other Field Code jurisdictions with
Montana, we find some similarities as well as some differences
in the manner that the courts have applied the statute. In Cali-
fornia, the courts have used the statute in the past, but are now
largely freed from its constraints. North Dakota has repealed the
statute, and the court now uses a test similar to the Restatement
Second. The courts of South Dakota strictly apply the statute,
with no augmentation. Finally, in Oklahoma, the court has
moved away from the application of the Field Code statute, and
has indicated a strong preference for the rules of the Restate-
ment Second. To complete the picture on how these jurisdictions
differ from Montana, this Comment must now turn to the most
recent conflict of laws case in Montana, and the Montana Su-
preme Court's apparent acceptance of the Restatement Second.
VI. BEYOND THE FIELD CODE: CASARoTO V. LOMBARDI
A. Determining the Law
In the most recent Montana case involving the conflict of
laws, the Montana Supreme Court has ventured into new
grounds, without attempting to resolve the confusion created in
the not so distant past. In Casarotto v. Lombardi,"2 the plain-
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See cases cited supra footnote 44.
129. 268 Mont. 369, 886 P.2d 931 (1994).
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tiffs entered into a franchise agreement to open a Subway sand-
wich shop in Great Falls, Montana; the store later failed when
another franchise opened in a more desirable location in the
town. 3 ' The Casarottos claimed a breach of a verbal agreement
providing that they could move their store to an alternate loca-
tion if one became available. 3' Yet, the contract included a
choice of law provision selecting the application of Connecticut
law and an arbitration clause requiring the Montana plaintiff to
submit to arbitration in Connecticut.'32 The District Court
stayed further judicial proceedings in Montana pending the arbi-
tration in Connecticut."3
On appeal, the plaintiff subsequently argued that the arbi-
tration clause was invalid because Montana law requires that
the clause be conspicuously displayed on the first page of the
contract.'3" The defendant contended that the choice of law
provision in the contract, indicating that Connecticut law con-
trolled the validity of the agreement, resolved any such dispute.
The court identified the first issue as whether, "[b]ased on con-
flict of law principles, is the franchise agreement entered into
between the Casarottos and [the defendants] governed by Con-
necticut law or Montana law?"1"
To determine the governing conflict of law rules, the court
looked neither to Kemp and the Field Code statute, nor to
Youngblood for guidance. The court unpredictably relied on Em-
erson v. Boyd.'36 In Emerson, the issue was whether an Indian
tribe's exercise of jurisdiction preempted the district court's juris-
diction.'37 The court in Emerson relied on the Restatement Sec-
ond to determine if a contract had sufficient connection to the
reservation for the tribal court to assume jurisdiction over the
case.' The court weighed the different factors from section
188(2) of the Restatement Second and determined that a suffi-
cient connection existed between the contract and the tribal
130. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 371, 886 P.2d at 932-33.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 372, 886 P.2d at 933.
133. Id.
134. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 372, 886 P.2d at 933 (relying on MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-5-114(4) (1993)). The arbitration clause was on page nine of the agreement.
135. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 373, 886 P.2d at 933.
136. 247 Mont. 241, 805 P.2d 587 (1991) (relying on R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort
Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983)).
137. Emerson, 247 Mont. at 242, 805 P.2d at 588.
138. Id. at 242-43, 805 P.2d at 588.
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reservation so as to preempt the district court's jurisdiction. 9
The main problem with the court's reliance upon Emerson in
Casarotto stems from the fact that jurisdictional questions differ
from questions involving the substantive law determination
under conflict of law rules in contracts."4 The conflicts issue in
Casarotto involved a contract dispute and, therefore, logically
followed Kemp and its progeny. Even in the Restatement Second,
jurisdictional matters are treated under entirely different rules
than contractual conflict of laws.' As Justice Gray pointed out
in her dissent to Casarotto, the court's encapsulation of Emerson
was correct, yet the application of the conflict of law rules from
the analogy resulted in an "inapplicability of that decision to the
case before [the court]." 4  Regardless of any incompatibility be-
tween the cases, the results of the analogy to Emerson are clear:
the court in Casarotto did not rely on the Field Code statute or
the Blair rule, but instead applied the rules of the Restatement
Second to decide the conflict of laws issue.
B. Applying the Law
Casarotto is factually difficult to discuss without creating
confusion. As noted above, the contract between the parties had
both a choice of law provision and an arbitration clause." If
the choice of law provision was valid and Connecticut law ap-
plied, the court would have enforced the arbitration clause. How-
ever, if the choice of law provision were invalidated, then the
court must determine which jurisdiction's laws would apply; the
court would have decided this by employing the conflict of law
rules for Montana. Then, in applying that substantive law, the
court could have discovered whether the arbitration clause was
valid.
The Montana Supreme Court in Casarotto tested the validity
of the choice of law provision by employing a two step process:
first, the court made a determination whether Montana law
would apply "absent an 'effective' choice of law by the parties;"
second, upon determining Montana law applied, the court inves-
tigated whether the "application of Connecticut law was contrary
139. Id.
140. See supra text accompanying note 3.
141. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
142. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 268 Mont. 369, 392, 886 P.2d 931, 945 (1994) (Gray,
J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 372, 886 P.2d at 933.
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to a fundamental policy" of Montana.'" In essence, the first
part ensured that the court's application of conflict of law rules
did not already indicate Connecticut law, thus rendering reliance
upon the choice of law provision in the contract moot. The second
part of the court's test ensured if the choice of law provision was
recognized and yet Montana had a materially greater interest,
that this recognition of Connecticut law did not offend the public
policies of Montana."
This two step process was taken from the Restatement Sec-
ond, section 187(2). The court properly ignored part (1) of section
187, because it only arises when the parties have no connection
to the chosen forum or the choice is arbitrary.1" The comments
to the Restatement Second indicate that as the materiality of the
local forum's interest increases, the fundamental character of the
public policy required to trump the choice of law lessens. ' 7 Ac-
cordingly, the analysis in Casarotto, which determined that Mon-
tana had the most significant relationship to the contract, re-
duced the weight required of the public policy needed to override
the choice of law. As a result, upon a finding that Montana had
the most significant relationship, the entire choice of law provi-
sion may be invalidated if the recognition of Connecticut law
would offend any Montana law or policy.'" Thus, once a suffi-
cient connection to Montana was established, public policy was
again the trump.
To bolster its heavy reliance upon public policy consider-
ations in conflict of law determinations, the Montana Supreme
Court relied upon Youngblood: "[T]his state's public policy will
ultimately determine whether choice of law provisions in con-
144. Id. at 375, 886 P.2d at 935.
145. See id. .
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. f (1971).
147. Id. at § 187 cmt. g.
148. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g,
stating:
The forum will not refrain from applying the chosen law merely because
this would lead to a different result than would be obtained under the local
law of the state of the otherwise applicable law. Application of the chosen
law will be refused only (1) to protect a fundamental policy of the state
which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the otherwise applica-
ble law, provided (2) that this state has a materially greater interest than
the state of the chosen law in the determination of the particular issue.
This is basically the test that the court used in Casarotto. The only departure of the
court from this analysis is found in the court's historical deference to discover in any
Montana law a fundamental public policy. See, e.g., Trammel v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen and Enginemen, 126 Mont. 400, 253 P.2d 329 (1953) (holding that a
public policy of the state is created by legislative enactment).
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tracts are 'effective'."149 The court quoted extensively from
Youngblood and included a recitation of that case's reliance upon
Kemp and the Field Code statute. Although it relied on
Youngblood for the imposition of public policy, ironically, all
available legal authority concerning the conflict of law rules from
the past fifteen years of Montana precedent was presented in the
quote, with no clear direction on how it all applied. The court
relied upon public policy from Youngblood and its analysis under
the Restatement Second to invalidate the choice of law provision
in the contract.
C. Casarotto as Precedent for Conflict of Law Rules
In light of the difficulties present in conflict of law rules in
Montana during the Kemp era, the court's decision in Casarotto
to use the Restatement Second is somewhat understandable. In
attempting to discard the rigidity of the Field Code statute and
the Blair rule, the Montana Supreme Court is trying to remove
these historical restraints on its conflict of law rules. However,
the court's reliance upon the Restatement Second in Casarotto to
resolve the conflict of laws issue leaves many questions unan-
swered. Most importantly, what is the current state of the law?
In this context, a hypothetical evaluation of the facts from
Casarotto without the choice of law provision is instructive.
Turning to Kemp and the Field Code statute as precedent, one
would first determine whether the issue was one of interpreta-
tion. Because the validity of the arbitration clause was the main
issue, no interpretation of the contract was at stake, and there-
fore, the Field Code statute would not apply. If the Blair rule
was applied-as extracted from the dictum in Kemp-again one
initially would determine whether the dispute involved a ques-
tion of validity or interpretation. Because the issue concerned
validity, under the Blair rule, the law of the place where the
contract was formed would control. Ironically in this case, nei-
ther Montana nor Connecticut law would govern, for the contract
was entered into in New York.1" Thus, under the Blair rule,
the courtwould apply New York law to determine if the arbitra-
tion clause was valid. This is another example of how rigid and
sometimes arbitrary these older conflict of law rules can be.
Yet, the Montana Supreme Court did not follow the rules
149. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 268 Mont. 369, 374, 886 P.2d 931, 934 (1994).
150. Id. at 375, 886 P.2d at 935.
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from Kemp and its progeny. Instead, the court turned to the
Restatement Second for guidance in the conflict of laws. In the
court's reliance upon Emerson for its acceptance of the Restate-
ment Second, the court has left an entire line of cases hanging in
a void.
Kemp and its progeny are still good law in Montana. The
Youngblood decision, which the court relied upon for imposing
Montana public policy in Casarotto, was also the most recent
reiteration of the court's continued reliance upon the Field Code
statute and the Blair rule. The court in Casarotto appears to
have extracted part of the fruits from Youngblood, but has re-
frained from importing the remainder of the tree, threatening to
cut it off at the roots.
Ultimately, the Montana Supreme Court must resolve the
inconsistent precedent by chopping this tree down in a more
effective and comprehensive manner.151 The present status of
the conflict of laws in Montana is far too confused to continue
effectively without further clarification from the authoritative ju-
dicial body of the state. The ruling in Casarotto, although help-
ing to extract Montana jurisprudence from historically antiquat-
ed rules, unfortunately also added to the confusion. The Montana
rules for conflict of laws currently appear to include the Field
Code statute, the Blair rule, the Restatement Second and the
public policy trump as enunciated in Youngblood. It is unclear
which of these rules, or combination thereof, the Montana Su-
preme Court will apply in the future.
The minimum repair required of the court is to clarify which
rule will be used. The present panoply of applicable rules is not
consistent with the predictability that practitioners require to
determine the law prior to trial. During the past several decades,
many aspects of the judicial system have undergone revision to
encourage the parties in litigation to settle before trial. Yet,
when basic determinations cannot be accurately predicted, such
as which law will be applied to a case, it becomes difficult to
narrow the settlement range to a mutually agreeable compro-
mise. The current confusion in the law actually encourages a
trial, for it increases the difficulty of the practitioner to realisti-
cally predict an outcome to the litigation and thereby discourages
settlement by the parties.
151. For a fine example of the Montana Supreme Court cutting off inconsistent
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VII. CONCLUSION
In Kemp, the Montana Supreme Court acknowledged the
applicability of the Field Code statute to decide conflict of law
issues. The court's augmentation of the statute through reliance
upon the Blair rule has failed to clarify the important distinction
between validity and interpretation. The federal court in Crosby,
citing Kemp, did not use the Field Code statute, but relied on the
Blair rule. Later, in Youngblood, the Montana Supreme Court
recognized that regardless of which law applied to a contract, a
contract or parts of it could be invalidated if it conflicted with
the public policies of Montana. Finally, in Casarotto, the court
largely ignored Kemp and its progeny, and employed the rules
from the Restatement Second-while reasserting public policy
considerations-to decide a conflict of laws issue.
One may claim that the Field Code statute binds the court
to certain rules.152 Ideally, the legislature should repeal the
Field Code statute, recognizing it as an outdated and incomplete
rule that leads to arbitrary results inconsistent with the inten-
tion of the contracting parties. The court could serve as a cata-
lyst to achieve this goal by announcing its objections to the Field
Code statute in its next opinion, as recently accomplished by the
North Dakota Supreme Court. With the statute repealed, the
court could adopt the Restatement Second as its guide with no
possible friction from a statutory directive.
As noted above, the conflict of law rules are largely proce-
dural in character, and the court should enjoy the freedom to
choose its rules of operation. The Restatement Second provides
an excellent source of authority in this area. It offers both the
practitioner and judge a flexible doctrine, based on modern prin-
ciples, which is clearly documented with comments and annota-
tions. Numerous jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement
Second and the Montana Supreme Court looks upon it with fa-
vor. An announcement by the court that the Restatement Second
is the authoritative guide for the resolution of conflict of law
issues in Montana would solve the confusion that now exists. If
the court in Casarotto intended to accomplish this, it has not
fully achieved its goal.
The Montana Supreme Court should resolve the present
uncertainty and confusion in the conflict of laws for contracts.
The combination of inconsistent precedent and conflicting reli-
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. a (claiming that
a state must apply its local statutory provisions directed to conflict of laws).
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ance upon statutory law creates a situation which fosters confu-
sion in an important area. It is a problem that can be easily
fixed: the court simply needs to recognize the problem and state
clearly which rule will apply in the future.
31
Lukes: Conflict of Laws
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1995
32
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/9
